Threshold Secret Sharing: Length of Shares

Length of Shares

$s = 1111$, length 4. This is 15 in base 10, so we go to smallest prime > 15, namely 17.

We use $p = 17$. $s = 1111$, $|s| = 4$.

Elements of $\mathbb{Z}_{17}$ are represented by strings of length 5

1. Everyone gets at least one share.
2. All shares length 5, even though s is length 4.

Can we always get length n? Length $n + 1$?

Length of Shares

If $|s| = n$ want prime p with $2^n < p$.

Known: For all n there exists prime p with $2^n \leq p \leq 2^{n+1}$.

Upshot: The secret is length n, the shares are of length $n+1$.

Good News: Every A_i gets ONE share.

Bad News: That share is of length $n+1$, not n.

VOTE: Can Zelda do threshold secret sh. where every student gets ONE share of length n?

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2. NO
3. YES given some hardness assumption
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Why Did We Use Primes?

We used $\mathbb{Z}_p$ since need every element to have a $*$-inverse.

Def: A **Field** is a set F together with operations $+, *$ such that

1. 0 is the $+$-identity: $(\forall x)[x + 0 = x]$.
2. 1 is the $*$-identity: $(\forall x)[x * 1 = x]$.
3. $+,*$ commutative: $(\forall x, y)[(x + y = y + x) \wedge (x * y = y * x)]$.
4. $+,*$ associative:
   $(\forall x, y, z)[(x+(y+z) = (x+y)+z) \wedge ((x*y)*z = x*(y*z))]$.
5. $(*, +)$ distributive: $(\forall x, y, z)[x * (y + z) = x * y + x * z]$.
6. Exists $+$-inverse: $(\forall x)(\exists y)[x + y = 0]$.
7. Exists $*$-inverses: $(\forall x \neq 0)(\exists y)[x * y = 1]$. **IMPORTANT!**

WE USED: p prime iff $\mathbb{Z}_p$ a field.

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If secret is s of length n, use the field on 2^n elements. All elements of it are of length n.

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WE USE: For all n, there is a field on 2^n elements.
If secret is s of length n, use the field on 2^n elements. All elements of it are of length n.

Upshot: For threshold there is a secret sh. scheme where everyone gets ONE share of size EXACTLY the size of the secret.

Example: A Field of 32 elements

$\mathbb{Z}_2[x]$ is the set of polys over $\mathbb{Z}_2$. $x^5 + x^2 + 1$ is irreducible in $\mathbb{Z}_2[x]$ (so it is not the product of two other elements of $\mathbb{Z}_2[x]$).

Field on 2^5 elements:

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4. One can show that this is a Field—mult has inverses. For that proof need that the poly $x^5 + x^2 + 1$ is irreducible.

Field on p^a Elements

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$f(x)$ is irreducible in $\mathbb{Z}_p[x]$, and of degree a

Field on p^a elements:

1. The elements are polys in $\mathbb{Z}_p[x]$ of degree $\leq a-1$.
2. Addition and subtraction are as usual.
3. Mult is MOD $f(x)$. So Multiply two polys together and mod down to degree $\leq a-1$ by assuming $f(x)=0$.
4. One can show that this is a Field- mult has inverses. For that proof need that the poly $f(x)$ is irreducible.

Practical and Pedagogical Point

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Can Shares be SHORTER than Secret?

1. If we use Fields, we have size-of-shares EQUALS size-of-secret.
2. If we use Mod p with p prime, we have size-of-shares EQUALS size-of-secret $(+1)$.

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Example of Why Can't Have Short Shares

Assume there is a $(4, 5)$ Secret Sharing Scheme where Zelda shares a secret of length 7. (This proof will assume NOTHING about the scheme.) The players are $A_1, \ldots, A_5$

Before the protocol begins there are $2^7 = 128$ possibilities for the secret.

Assume that A_5 gets a share of length 6. We show that the scheme is NOT info-theoretic secure.

Example of Why Can't Have Short Shares, Cont

If A_1, A_2, A_3, A_5 got together they COULD learn the secret, since its a $(4, 5)$ scheme.

We show that A_1, A_2, A_3 can learn SOMETHING about the secret.

$CAND = \emptyset$. $CAND$ will be set of Candidates for s.

For $x \in \{0,1\}^6$ (go through ALL shares A_5 could have)

A_1, A_2, A_3 pretend A_5 has x and deduce candidates secret s'
$CAND := CAND \cup \{s'\}$

Secret is in $CAND$. $|CAND| = 2^6 < 2^6$. So A_1, A_2, A_3 have **eliminated** many strings from being the secret s That is INFORMATION!!!!

On the HW you will do more examples and perhaps generalize to show can NEVER have shorter shares.

Are Shorter Shares Ever Possible?

If we **demand** info-security then **everyone** gets a share $\geq n$.
What if we only **demand** comp-security?
VOTE

1. Can get shares $< \beta n$ with a hardness assumption.
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Will do that later.

Generalize The Problem

Our problem: Player $A_1, \ldots, A_m$, secret s.

1. If t of them get together they can find s.
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You've Been Punked!

A_1, A_2 CAN find s but A_1, A_2, A_3 CANNOT. Thats Stupid!

What is it about Threshold?

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$\mathcal{X}$ is the set of all subsets of $\{A_1, \ldots, A_m\}$ with $\geq t$ players.

1. If $Y \in \mathcal{X}$ then the players in Y can find s.
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This question makes sense. What is it about $\mathcal{X}$ that makes it make sense?

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$\mathcal{X}$ is closed under superset:
If $Y \in \mathcal{X}$ and $Y \subseteq Z$ then $Z \in \mathcal{X}$.

Access Structures

Definition

An **Access Structure** is a subset of $\{A_1, \ldots, A_m\}$ closed under superset.

1. If $\mathcal{X}$ is an access structure then the following questions make sense:
   - 1.1 Is there a secret sh. scheme for $\mathcal{X}$?
   - 1.2 Is there a secret sh. scheme for $\mathcal{X}$ where all shares are the same size as the secret?
2. (t, m)-Threshold is an Access structure. The poly method gives a Secret Sharing scheme where all the shares are the same length as the secret.

Definition

A sec. sharing sch. is **ideal** if all shares same size as secret.

OR of AND: Ideal Sec Sharing Protocol

Want

1. At least 2 of A_1, A_2, A_3, OR
2. At least 4 of $B_1, B_2, B_3, B_4, B_5, B_6, B_7$.

How can Zelda do this?

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To generalize this we need a better notation.

Notation for Threshold

Let $TH_A(t, m)$ be the Boolean Formula that represents at least t out of m of the A_i's.

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At least 3 of $B_1, \ldots, B_6$.

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Notation $TH_A(t_1, m_1) \vee TH_B(t_2, m_2)$ means that:

1. $\geq t_1$ $A_1, \ldots, A_{m_1}$ can learn the secret.
2. $\geq t_2$ $B_1, \ldots, B_{m_2}$ can learn the secret.
3. No other group can learn the secret (e.g., A_1, A_2, B_1 cannot)

OR of $TH_A(t, m)$'s: Ideal Sec Sharing Protocol

There is Ideal Secret Sharing for $TH_A(t_1, m_1) \vee \cdots \vee TH_Z(t_{26}, m_{26})$

1. Zelda and the $A_1, \ldots, A_{m_1}$ do (t_1, m_1) secret sh..
2. $\vdots$
3. Zelda and the $Z_1, \ldots, Z_{m_{26}}$ do (t_{26}, m_{26}) secret sh..

Note We now have a large set of non-threshold scenarios that have ideal secret sh..

AND of $TH_A(t, m)$s: An Example

We want that if ≥ 2 of A_1, A_2, A_3, A_4 AND ≥ 4 of $B_1, \ldots, B_7$ get together than they can learn the secret, but no other groups can. Think about it.

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1. Zelda has secret s, $|s| = n$.
2. Zelda generates random $r \in \{0,1\}^n$.
3. Zelda does $(2,4)$ secret sh. of r with A_1, A_2, A_3, A_4.
4. Zelda does $(4,7)$ secret sh. of $r \oplus s$ with $B_1, \ldots, B_7$.
5. If ≥ 2 of A_i's get together they can find r. If ≥ 4 of B_i's get together they can find $r \oplus s$. So if they call get together they can find

$$r \oplus (r \oplus s) = s$$

AND of $TH_A(t, m)$s: General

$TH_A(t_1, m_1) \wedge \cdots \wedge TH_Z(t_{26}, m_{26})$ can do secret sh..

1. Zelda has secret s, $|s| = n$.
2. Zelda generates random $r_1, \ldots, r_{25} \in \{0,1\}^n$.
3. Zelda does (t_1, m_1) secret sh. of r_1 with A_i's.
4. $\vdots$
5. Zelda does (t_{25}, m_{25}) secret sh. of r_{25} with Y_i's.
6. Zelda does (t_{26}, m_{26}) secret sh. of $r_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus r_{25} \oplus s$ with Z_i's.
7. If $\geq t_1$ of A_i's get together they can find r_1. If $\geq t_2$ of B_i's get together they can find r_2. $\cdots$ If $\geq t_{25}$ of Y_i's get together they can find r_{25}. If $\geq t_{26}$ of Z_i's get together they can find $r_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus r_{25} \oplus s$. So if they call get together they can find

$$r_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus r_{25} \oplus (r_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus r_{25} \oplus s) = s$$

General Theorem

Definition A **monotone formula** is a Boolean formula with no NOT signs.

If you put together what we did with TH and use induction you can prove the following:

Theorem Let $X_1, \ldots, X_N$ each be a threshold $TH_A(t, m)$ but all using DIFFERENT players.

Let $F(X_1, \ldots, X_N)$ be a monotone Boolean formula where each X_i appears only once. Then Zelda can do ideal secret sh. where only sets that satisfy $F(X_1, \ldots, X_N)$ can learn the secret.

Routine proof left to the reader. Might be on a HW or the Final.

Access Structures that admit Ideal Sec. Sharing

1. Threshold Secret sharing: if t or more get together. WE DID THIS.
2. Monotone Boolean Formulas of Threshold where every set of players appears only once. WE DID THIS.
3. Let G be a graph. Let s, t be nodes. People are edges. Any connected path can get the secret. WE DIDN"T DO THIS AND WON"T.
4. Monotone Span Programs (Omitted – its a Matrix Thing) WE DIDN"T DO THIS AND WON"T.

Access Structures that do not admit Ideal Sec Sharing

1. $(A_1 \wedge A_2) \vee (A_2 \wedge A_3) \vee (A_3 \wedge A_4)$
2. $(A_1 \wedge A_2 \wedge A_3) \vee (A_1 \wedge A_4) \vee (A_2 \wedge A_4) \vee (A_3 \vee A_4)$ (**Captain and Crew**) A_1, A_2, A_3 is the crew, and A_4 is the captain. Entire crew, or captain and 1 crew, can get s.
3. $(A_1 \wedge A_2 \wedge A_3) \vee (A_1 \wedge A_4) \vee (A_2 \wedge A_4)$ (**Captain and Rival**) A_1, A_2, A_3 is the crew, A_3 is a rival, A_4 is the captain. Entire crew, or captain and 1 crew who is NOT rival, can get s.
4. Any access structure that **contains** any of the above.

In all of the above, all get a share of size $1.5n$ and this is optimal.

Open Question

Determine for every access structure the functions $f(n)$ and $g(n)$ such that

1. ($\exists$) Scheme where everyone gets $\leq f(n)$ sized share.
2. ($\forall$) Scheme someone gets $\geq g(n)$ sized share.
3. $f(n)$ and $g(n)$ are close together.